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In this study the experimental auction method is used in a between sample analysis to asses 
hypothetical bias and Willingness To Pay (WTP) for canned crushed tomatoes enriched with 
lycopene. The empirical analysis shows the presence of statistically significant bias between 
hypothetical and real bids at different level of bids. The difference in bids for the functional 
and control products defines the implicit WTP variable. Both WTP and implicit WTP show a 
statistically significant total difference between real and hypothetical bids only at the upper 
and lower levels of bids. These differences are of opposite signs and balance on average. 
Focusing on the factors driving the bias, the empirical analysis points out two main groups of 
variables: socio-demographic variables and attitude toward food technologies.  
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The study of the discrepancy between intentions and actual behavior has a long tradition in 
the social sciences (Ajzen, Brown and Carvajal, 2004; Lusk, McLaughlin and Jaeger, 2007). 
The gap between people’s intentions and behaviors (Ajzen and Fishbein, 2000) yields so-
called hypothetical bias, a systematic overestimation of Willingness To Pay (WTP) in 
hypothetical compared to real scenarios (Harrison and Ruström, 2008; Loomis, 2011; Mitani 
and Flores, 2010; Murphy, Alle, Stevens and Weatherhead, 2005): “hypothetical bias is the 
difference between what people say they are willing to pay in a hypothetical survey question 
and what they will actually pay in a non-hypothetical experiment when money is really on 
the line” (Grebitus, Lusk, and Nayga, 2013, p. 12). 
Various explanations for the observed difference between intentions and behaviors have 
been proposed. According to Campbell (1963), they are both affected by the individual’s 
underlying latent disposition toward a certain target: people with highly positive or negative 
attitudes are expected to respond consistently in hypothetical and real contexts, whereas 
individuals who hold moderate attitudes would respond differently in the hypothetical context 
and in the more demanding real context. 
A different interpretation relates the discrepancy between intention and behavior to the 
difference between symbolic representations and real-life representations (Blumer, 1956): 
salient features of a real situation could activate beliefs about a certain behavior differing 
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from the beliefs that could be activated in a hypothetical situation (Ajzen and Sexton, 1999). 
In particular, a hypothetical scenario could activate more favorable (or less unfavorable) 
beliefs than an actual one (Ajzen et al., 2004).  
Additional arguments have been proposed in the literature to explain the hypothetical bias: 
the uncertainty about the good values (Johannesson et al. 1999; Champ and Bishop, 2001; 
RIF), the individuals’ strategic responses to influence the price or availability of goods 
(Carson and Groves, 2007), and the existence of social desirability bias (e.g., List et al. 2004; 
Lusk and Norwood, 2009; Lusk and Norwood, 2011). Finally, Aadland, Caplan, and Phillips 
(2007) recognized the absence of a universal explanation of hypothetical bias. 
Understanding why people misstate their actual preferences for a good when asked a 
hypothetical question remains a major issue in non-market valuation. While biases have been 
observed in both directions, much of the specialist literature suggests that people tend to 
overstate their actual willingness to pay in hypothetical situations. 
In the 1980s, much of the experimental hypothetical bias literature tested the overall validity 
of contingent valuation (Harrison and Rutström, 2008). However, in the 1990s there was a 
plethora of works that used the experimental auction technique (List and Shogren ,1998; 
Diamond and Hausman, 1994; Fox et al. ,1998; Neill et al. 1994), these studies show the 
presence of hypothetical bias, thus calling for the use of various calibration factors. There are 
exceptions to the conclusion about the existence of hypothetical bias (e.g., Champ et al., 
1997; Johannesson, 1998; Sinden, 1988; Smith and Mansfield, 1998).  
According to the above-cited works, hypothetical bias does not seem to exist either in the 
case of public or private goods. However, such studies appear to be in the minority: the 
average person would appear to exaggerate his or her actual WTP across a broad spectrum 
of goods with vastly different experimental protocols. 
Nonetheless, it has been widely observed that the issue of hypothetical bias still represents a 
challenge for scholars, and further research is required to identify factors and clarify 
processes related to the hypothetical/real incongruence toward a general theory of 
hypothetical bias (Harrison and Rutström, 2008; Loomis, 2011; Mitani and Flores, 2010; 
Murphy, Allen, Stevens, and Weatherhead, 2005).  
The paper starts with a description of the experimental design and the methodology. A short 








Between the end of June and the first week of July 2014, several sessions of experimental 
auctions were conducted in the computer lab of the Department of Agricultural Science in 
Portici (Naples) in order to assess WTP for a specific functional product (crushed tomatoes 
enriched with lycopene). In all, 190 participants in the auctions were recruited among 
college students of the Department of Agricultural Science and other departments of the 
University of Naples. Upon their arrival participants, who were not informed about the 
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purpose of the experiment, received their endowment (15 euro). Each auction required the 
participation of ten people. The recruitment of undergraduate students, rather than those 
responsible for food purchasing, should not cause significant distortions in the results 
because there is a consistent convergence between student opinion and the responsible act 
of purchasing (Depositario et al., 2009). It should also be noted that students possess 
greater ability to perform the tasks required by the experiment which was completely 
computerized. Finally, the students belonged to the Y generation (Millennials), a social group 
more inclined to evaluate emerging new food styles (Howe and Strauss, 2009). 
The entire experimental design was computerized both to accelerate data acquisition and to 
minimize the possibility of error in the data set collection phase. The software programs used 
were:  
· Z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007), for the collection of bids in auctions. Through this program 
it was possible to speed up the evolution of the experiment and store real-time data 
obtained;  
· Google Drive, to administer the questionnaires; 
· Millisecond Inquisit, for the collection of data on implicit measures through a SC_IAT 
test (Single Category Implicit Association Test). 
For this experiment, the fifth-price mechanism with a full bidding process was employed. 
Following Drichoutis, Lazaridis, and Nayga (2008), Bernard and He (2010), and Hellyer, 
Fraser, and Haddock-Fraser (2012), we did not use the reference price, since we were aware 
of the possibility of the occurrence of bid affiliation. No price feedback among multiple 
rounds was reported (Corrigan et al., 2012). 
The experiment was divided into several stages. During the experiment each participant was 
asked to use an ID (identifier) in order to trace the source computer of the data, thereby 
preserving complete anonymity. The experimenter provided participants with all the 
information on the auction mechanism. The subjects were informed about the dominant 
strategy to reveal their true value for the products offered. To understand the bidding 
behavior and the mechanism, five training rounds were conducted using three different 
candy bars.  
After the auctions, the participants were asked to complete a questionnaire about their 
demographic characteristics and consumption habits. They also answered questions on 
explicit measures validated to explain the behavior of consumer choice for food products, the 
Food Choice Questionnaire (FCQ), the Food Technology Neophobia Scale (FTNS), together 
with questions related to a psychometric scale, Trust in Science Scale (TISS), which 
measures public attitudes toward scientific research and technologies. Finally, to measure 
social desirability, the short form of the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale was used. 
The data collected generate the variables summarized in the Appendix under the headings of 
Demographic Variables, Control Variables, Implicit Associations and Explicit Attitudes. 
The 190 participants were divided into two sub-samples, joining two different types of 
auctions: 90 individuals were assigned to the first group, denoted by hypothetical auction. 
Subjects were fully briefed about the auction mechanism, and after the training session the 
products studied were presented. The second group, termed non-hypothetical or real 
auction, involved 100 subjects. In this type of auction participants are informed that the 
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winners will actually buy the product randomly selected by paying the fifth price figure 1 
shows the trend of bids in the two groups. 
The products in the auction were two packs of three 400-gram cans of crushed tomatoes: 
conventional crushed tomatoes, and crushed tomatoes enriched in lycopene (50% more). 
During the auction, each participant was asked to submit simultaneously a bid for each of 
the two crushed tomato products. The bids were collected and the step repeated for four 
additional rounds. 
When all five rounds were completed, a random draw determined which of the five rounds 
was chosen. A random draw then defined which of the three crushed tomato products was 
selected. The top four bidders on the bidding product in each round purchased the crushed 
tomato package, paying a price equivalent to the fifth-highest bid for the product. 
 
Figura 1. Mean bids by groups 
 




Quantile regressions were computed in order to investigate the price bid model, for both real 
and hypothetical bids, not only on average but also at different quantiles. This indicates 
changes in the coefficients across quantiles: an explanatory variable may have a different 
impact on bids depending upon the chosen quantile, if the focus is on low or high bids. 
Hypothetical and real bids were compared and the difference between the two was 
decomposed into coefficient and covariate effects, which meant splitting the discrepancy 
between real and hypothetical prices into respectively unexplained and explained effects. 
The former is due to differing estimated coefficients and in this context it represents the 
actual bias. The latter relates the difference in bids to the difference in the covariates of the 
two groups.  
So far hypothetical bias has been measured in experiments considering within or between 
samples. The main problem in the former is the anchoring effect (Beggs and Graddy, 2009; 
Lusk  and Shogren, 2007) while in the latter it is difficult to asses the comparability of the 
samples, at least with respect to the attitudinal variables.  
Conventional
Enriched
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Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) discuss average decomposition, while decomposition is 
here considered not only on average but also in the tails, at lower and higher bids/quantiles. 
The quantile regression estimates at various quantiles (Koenker, 2005) provide the tools to 
compute the decomposition. Machado and Mata (2005) introduce quantile regression-based 
decomposition, while Chernozhukov et al. (2013) provide tools to implement inference.  
Consider the linear regression model yi=xi ei, where xi is the row vector including the i
th 
observation for all the explanatory variables of the model. The quantile regression objective 
function is an asymmetrically weighted regression, and the asymmetric weights allow the 
estimated line to move away from the mean of the conditional distribution. For the selected 
quantile , it assigns weights  and 1-  to the observations depending on their position 
above or below the estimated equation. The coefficients are computed by minimizing the 
following objective function where the absolute value of the regression errors,  is 
asymmetrically weighted by  or (1- ) and the weights set the position of the estimated line.  
To analyze a data set split in two different subsets, each identified by an index assuming 
values 0 – for instance in hypothetical bid experiments, and 1 otherwise, in the real bid case, 
a decomposition approach can be implemented. Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) 
decomposition allows the difference between subsets to be written as  
 
E(y1 - y0) =  E( y1/1 - y0/1 + y0/1 - y0/0 ) 
 
In the bids example y1/1 coincides with Yr and y0/0 coincides with Yh. The first term of the 
decomposition, y1/1 - y0/1, measures the difference in bids due to changes in the regression 
coefficients, ( 1- 0). The second term instead looks at the difference in bids due to changes 
in the covariates, such as changes in the characteristics when moving from the real to the 
hypothetical subset, and provides a measure of the composition effect. These terms are 
generally computed at their average values. The result is an average measure of bid 
difference between the two subsets.  
However, the terms in a decomposition can take different values according to the selected 
quantile of the Y distribution, the center, the lower and the upper tail. Therefore the 
decomposition can be estimated not only on average, but also in the tails by means of the 
quantile regression estimated coefficients. In a quantile regression decomposition it is 
possible to verify whether any discrepancy is statistically significant at each quantile and 
whether such a discrepancy is stable or changes across quantiles. 
 
 
Results of the regression model 
 
Results of the regression model 
 
The selected model focuses on the enriched tomatoes as a function of three main groups of 
variables: socio-demographics, attitudinal and control variables. The definition of the 
variables can be found in the table 1, while the estimates of the regression coefficients are 
reported in tables 2, 3 and 4. 
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Next the analysis at the various quantiles can be implemented. At this stage we analyze two 
different dependent variables. In a first model the real and hypothetical bids for the enriched 
product are considered, WTPL50 in the tables, while in the second model the focus is on the 
willingness to pay for the specific functional attribute. The latter is computed as the 
difference between bids declared for the functional product and bids declared for the control 
product. The difference between the two measures the implicit willingness to pay for the 
functional attribute, IMPL_WTPL50 in the tables. 
 
Table 1. Summary statistics of the variables 
DEPENDENT VAR. 
REAL AUCTION HYPOTHETICAL AUCTION 
STD. DEV. .25 .50 .75 STD. DEV. .25 .50 .75 
BIDL50 1.392 1.02 1.80 2.70 2.429 1.50 2.00 3.00 
IMPL_WTPL50 0.824 0.20 0.45 0.90 0.639 0.20 0.50 1.00 
SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC 
REAL AUCTION HYPOTHETICAL AUCTION 
STD. DEV. .25 .50 .75 STD. DEV. .25 .50 .75 
age 4.007 21 23.8 25.7 2.820 20 22.1 24 
gender  0.497 0 0.56 1 0.500 0 .47 1 
children under 12 0.357 0 0.15 1 0.328 0 0.12 1 
income 0.878 2.00 2.30 3 1.026 2 2.35 3 
political orientation 0.444 0 .730 1 0.408 0 0.78 1 
CONTROL VARIABLES 
REAL AUCTION HYPOTHETICAL AUCTION 
STD. DEV. .25 .50 .75 STD. DEV. .25 .50 .75 
consumption frequency  0.588 2 2.88 3 0.624 2 2.78 3 
MEASURES 
REAL AUCTION HYPOTHETICAL AUCTION 
STD. DEV. .25 .50 .75 STD. DEV. .25 .50 .75 
SC_IAT 0.415 -0.41 -0.07 0.25 0.406 -0.24 -0.06 0.26 
social desirability 0.650 3.58 3.97 4.33 0.749 3.33 3.88 4.33 
FCQ health 0.806 5.50 5.81 6.50 0.808 5.16 5.73 6.33 
FCQ natural 0.961 5.00 5.67 6.33 1.007 5.33 5.69 6.33 
FCQ price 1.193 4.33 5.09 6.25 1.276 4.33 5.25 6.33 
FCQ familiarity 1.355 3.33 4.32 5.33 1.284 3.00 4.13 5.00 
FTNS unnecessary 1.128 2.50 3.45 4.33 1.130 3.16 3.83 4.50 
FTNS risks 1.190 3.31 4.04 4.75 1.234 3.50 4.18 5.00 
FTNS benefits 1.287 2.50 3.19 4.00 1.324 2.50 3.34 4.00 
trust in science 0.491 1.80 2.13 2.40 0.490 2.00 2.20 2.40 
 
Table 2. Single equation estimates for hypothetical, Yh, and real bids, Yr for the enriched 
product 
 
   OLS Yh  OLS Yr  
  
Huber Yh   Huber Yr 







Gender 1.229 0. 632 
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Table 3 (continues). Single equation estimates for hypothetical, Yh, and real bids, Yr for the 
enriched product 
 
   OLS Yh  OLS Yr  
  
Huber Yh   Huber Yr 









































































































N 450 500 
  
450 500 
R2 0.20 0.32 
     Source: own elaboration, estimated coefficients not statistically different from zero in italics 
 
The results for the first, second and third quartile regression are reported in table 3 for 
hypothetical and real bid regressions and in table 4 for the implicit willingness to pay. It can 
be seen that across quartiles the estimated coefficients do change and, depending on the 
selected quantile, the explanatory variables have a different impact on the dependent 
variable, a different explanatory power. The comparison of hypothetical and real bids shows 
that quite a number of variables are not statistically significant in the hypothetical bids while 
they are significant in the real bids. This is the case of children under 12, political 
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orientation, frequency consumption, FCQ health, FCQ natural, FCQ familiarity, all the FTNS 
variables: FTNS unnecessary, FTNS risk, FTNS benefit, trust in science and SC-IAT test.  
Social Desirability, instead, is the only variable which is not statistically different from zero in 
both the hypothetical/real bids and the hypothetical/real implicit WTP equations. Since the 
products of the experiments are very common and frequently used, and don’t present any 
attribute (Fisher,  1993; Böhm, 2012) this results is not surprising even if it partially 
contradicts Norwood and Lusk (2011). 
 





    .25     .50     .75      .25    .50    .75 
age 
  .092***   .043   .091*   -.007   .003   .003 
 (.028)  (.056)  (.043)   (.024)  (.034)  (.043) 
gender 
  .841***   .702*** 1.419***    .583***   .229   .557** 
 (.153)  (.252)  (.220)   (.167)  (.147)  (.255) 
children under 12 
 -.273  -.104   .130   -.215  -.599***  -.782*** 
 (.264)  (.217)  (.362)   (.174)  (.165)  (.236) 
family income 
  .177***   .355**   .242***    .136   .037   .171 
 (.060)  (.104)  (.065)   (.082)  (.123)  (.139) 
political orientation 
 -.148  -.275  -.391   -.587**  -.379***  -.569** 
 (.207)  (.180)  (.258)   (.225)  (.124)  (.231) 
consumption frequency  
  .059   .000  -.735***    .230*   .438**   .348 
 (.090  (.140)  (.248)   (.155)  (.186)  (.214) 
FCQ health 
  .115   .137   .428***    .513***   .221   .161 
 (.157)  (.086)  (.206)   (.110)  (.159)  (.158) 
FCQ natural 
  .039   .144   .113   -.214***   .004   .131 
 (.078)  (.099)  (.199)   (.061)  (.105)  (.153) 
FCQ price 
 -.148**  -.259***  -.306***   -.174**  -.244**  -.256*** 
 (.061)  (.070)  (.053)   (.073)  (.094)  (.097) 
FCQ familiarity 
 -.027   .045  -.007    .151**   .114   .142 
 (.089)  (.065)  (.094)   (.066)  (.081)  (.100) 
FTNS unnecessary 
 -.072  -.091  -.252   -.187**  -.165**  -.125 
 (.090)  (.114)  (.189)   (.077)  (.061)  (.123) 
FTNS risk 
 -.020  -.043   .197   -.099   -.201***  -.281* 
 (.095)  (.076)  (.135)   (.076)  (.059)  (.162) 
FTNS benefit 
 -.009   .048  -.053    .074   .050   .389** 
 (.074)  (.075)  (.088)   (.068)  (.067)  (.157) 
trust in science 
  .332**   .047   .184    .091   .432**   .708** 
 (.156)  (.166)  (.150)   (.093)  (.221)  (.326) 
social desirability 
 -.011   .084   .290    .044   .060   .089 
 (.030)  (.148)  (.185)   (.118)  (.129)  (.142) 
SC-IAT test 
 -.316  -.575**  -.140    .465***   .724***   .851** 
 (.225)  (.265)  (.413)   (.128)  (.234)  (.350) 
constant 
-1.638  -.118  -.075   -.449  1.103 -1.148 
(1.701) (2.293) (2.595)   (.986) (1.429) (3.200) 
n 
 
   450    450    450 500     500    500 
Source: own elaboration, standard errors in parentheses 
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   .25    .50     .75      .25   .50    .75 
age 
 .018  .035  .090**   -.000  .002  .023 
(.018) (.026) (.043)   (.011) (.009)  (.018) 
gender 
-.015  .347***  .730***    .165***  .253***  .069 
(.115) (.106) (.231)   (.034) (.076)  (.103) 
children under 12 
-.293 -.306  .048    .066  .026  -.283*** 
(.206) (.228) (.390)   (.072) (.073)  (.106) 
family income 
 .100**  .049  .025    .051  .120**   .100 
(.049) (.053) (.058)   (.042) (.052)  (.080) 
political orientation 
-228** -.207 -.157   -.155** -.207**  -.389** 
(.111) (.184) (.248)   (.083) (.094) (.093) 
consumption frequency  
 .161*  .085  .096    .094**  .165**  .337*** 
(.096) (.063) (.111)   (.044) (.074) (.097) 
FCQ health 
 .095 -.020  .061    .109**  .139**  .222*** 
(.070) (.072) (.057)   (.053) (.057) (.056) 
FCQ natural 
 .009  .052  .161**   -.074** -.060  .017 
(.046) (.049) (.074)   (.033)  (.050) (.068) 
FCQ price 
 .089**  .021 -.045   -050* -.046 -.191*** 
(.035) (.051) (.090)   (.030) (.040) (.036) 
FCQ familiarity 
-.011 -.074 -.193***    .059***  .043*  .031 
(.077) (.045) (.066)   (.022) (.023) (.045) 
FTNS unnecessary 
-.035 -.052  .061   -.103*** -.062 -.012 
(.053) (.054) (.080)   (.031) (.043)  (.067) 
FTNS risk 
 .055**  .034 -.017   -.013 -110*** -.192*** 
(.024) (.046) (.095)   (.032) (.040) (.048) 
FTNS benefit 
-.030 -.023 -.003    .018  .072**  .063 
(.030) (.029) (.057)   (.025) (.030) (.050) 
trust in science 
 .170  .156  .210*   -127**  .289***  . 325*** 
(.108) (.129) (.109)   (.051) (.098) (.123) 
social desirability 
 .073  .002  .051    .127  .004  .117 
(.109) (.066) (.078)   (.089)  (.044) (.075) 
SC-IAT test 
 .103 -.062  .032   -.065  .198***  .309*** 
(.113) (.146) (.209)   (.048) (.084) (.148) 
constant 
-2.388** -.355 -2.846    .206 -.438 -1.408 
(.093) (1.167) (1.908)   (.494) (.731) (1.385) 
n 
 
   450    450    450 500     500    500 
  Source: own elaboration, standard errors in parentheses 
 
Results of the decomposition analysis 
 
The comparison between real and hypothetical WTPL50, computed on average by the 
Oaxaca-Blinder approach, yields a total difference Ey1 - Ey0 = 0.452. The latter is split into 
endowment effect (Ex1 - Ex0) = -.267, and coefficient effect ( 1 - 0)=0.719. All these 
terms are statistically relevant, as can be seen in the top section of table 7. Therefore, there 
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is a difference between real and hypothetical bids, which is only partially explained by a 
difference in the covariates. The unexplained/coefficient component can be interpreted as 
the actual bias. Indeed, the covariate effect is opposite in sign with respect to the coefficient 
effect, thus resulting in a smaller total difference. 
For the IMPL_WTPL50 variable, Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition yields the following results: 
total difference Ey1 - Ey0 = 0.030, endowment effect (Ex1 - Ex0) = -0.154 and coefficient 
effect ( 1 - 0) = 0.184. The total difference is not statistically relevant, and this is the case 
since in the decomposition the coefficient and covariate effects are statistically significant but 
have the opposite sign. The components of the decomposition balance each other on 
average. 
Next the decomposition is computed at various quantiles, table 5 presents the results of the 
decomposition of WTPL50. The first two columns compute the total difference at each 
selected quantile between distributions of hypothetical and real bids together with the 
standard errors. The difference is positive and statistically different from zero, showing that 
the two distributions differ from one another. The next four columns report the 
decomposition of such differences between covariate and coefficient effects. It can be noted 
that they are all statistically significant, but if the covariate effect is negative and becomes 
more severe across quantiles, the coefficient effect is positive and grows across quantiles. 
Thus the global comparison of real and hypothetical bids proves less evident than the actual 
bias. The terms of the decomposition partially balance each other and the total difference 
presents a u-shaped pattern across quantiles reaching the lowest value around the median. 
This shows how the analysis at the various quantiles detects effects that cannot otherwise be 
revealed.   
Table 6 reports the results of the Machado and Mata (2005) decomposition approach for the 
IMPL_WTPL50 variable. In this case the total difference between distributions is significant 
only in the lower tail, the two deciles at the bottom and the 40th decile of the total difference 
of the distributions, and furthermore they are opposite in sign. On the one hand, this result 
confirms the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition result of a non-significant difference between 
distributions on average, but while before the components of the decomposition seem to 
balance each other on average, now is the opposite sign of the total difference that cancels 
out on average. Indeed, looking at the quantile decomposition, the covariate effect is not 
statistically relevant, while the coefficient effect, unexplained by the model, is significant at 
the bottom decile and from the 40th upward. The actual bias has the opposite sign, the 
opposite behavior in the tails, with hypothetical larger than real at the upper IMPL_WTPL50 
values, from the 40th decile up. Conversely, real is greater than hypothetical IMPL_WTPL50 at 
the lowest decile. 
Finally, the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition (table 7), albeit implemented only on average, 
yields additional information about the relevance of each explanatory variable within the 
average decomposition. The table shows that on average the impact of most of the 
covariates is hardly ever significant for both WTPL50 and IMPL_WTPL50. The coefficient 
effect shows a statistically relevant difference between real and hypothetical WTPL50 in the 
case of gender, family income, frequency consumption, FTNS risk, FTNS benefit, SCIAT. 
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Table 5. Differences between the hypothetical and real bid distributions of WTPL50 
  total effect covariate effect coefficient effect 
 quantile      std. err.       std. err.       std. err. 
 .10       .5182     .076 -.1080   .076  .6262   .060 
 .20      .4000     .057 -.2216   .072  .6216   .061     
 .30        .3065     .062      -.3033   .077    .6098   .063 
 .40      .2893     .063      -.2932   .094  .5826   .075 
 .50      .2890     .060 -.2903   .117     .5793   .073   
 .60        .2773     .071       -.2983   .147                   .5756   .079 
 .70        .2199     .085    -.4812   .186  .7011   .114 
 .80        .3684     .100    -.5511   .228  .9195   .168 
 .90        .7806     .148    -.7968   .363  1.577   .281 
 
 
Table 6. Differences between the hypothetical and real bid distributions of IMPL_WTPL50 
  total effect covariate effect coefficient effect 
 quantile         std. err.        std. err.    std. err. 
 .10       -.2737   .027          .0042   .076   -.2779   .084   
 .20      -.0536   .024        .0092   .047 -.0628   .038 
 .30          -.0006   .019         .0576   .040   -.0583   .033 
 .40         .0585   .026      -.0048   .040  .1066   .028   
 .50         .0506   .029    -.0752   .046     .1259   .025 
 .60           .0591   .034            -.0719   .056  .1310   .039 
 .70           .0592   .040      -.0846   .073  .1438   .054 
 .80           .0847   .055         -.1918   .110      .2766   .075 
 .90           .1847   .096      -.3652   .189  .5500   .135 
 
Table 7. Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition: difference between hypothetical and real distributions  
 WTPL50      IMPL_WTPL50 
               std. err.                        std. err. 
Total difference    .4524   .098    .0299   .060 
Explained   -.2670   .067   -.1546   .042 
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Table 7 (continues). Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition: difference between hypothetical and real distributions  
 
   
covariates 
    
   
           std. err. 
   
      std. err. 
age 
  
-.1378    .047     
 
-.0953   .032   
gender 
  
-.0734    .030 
 
-.0251   .011 
children under 12 
 
  .0168   .013 
 
  .0074   .006 
family income 
 
  .0109   .012 
 
  .0034   .004 
 political orientation 
 
-.0225    .012 
 
-.0109   .006 
consumption frequency  
 
 -.0243   .013  
 
-.0188   .009 
FCQ health 
 
 -.0185   .014 
 
-.0159   .011 
FCQ natural 
 
 -.0016   .006 
 
-.0007   .003 
FCQ price 
 
 -.0165   .010 
 
-.0051   .004  
FCQ  familiarity 
 
  .0032   .007 
 
-.0041   .005 
trust in science 
 
  .0285   .014  
 
  .0226   .011    
FTNS unnecessary 
 
 -.0382   .019 
 
-.0255   .011 
FTNS risks 
 
 -.0076   .007 
 
-.0010   .003 
FTNS benefits 
 
  .0215   .013 
 
 .0134   .008  
social desirability 
 
 -.0152   .009  
 
-.0135   .007 
SC_IAT  
  
  .0079   .006 
 
 .0046  .004 
   
coefficients  
    
   
std. err. 
   
       std. err. 
age 
  
1.6169      1.034 
 
 -.6260     .637   
gender 
  
   .3067      .113 
 
  .1043     .068 
children under 12 
 
   .0629      .035 
 
 -.0124     .024 
family income 
 
   .4667      .224 
 
  .0659     .128 
 political orientation 
 
   .0158      .171 
 
-.1935      .117 
 consumption frequency  
 
-1.3668      .456   
 
-.4706      .263 
FCQ health 
 
  -.4344      .766 
 
-.6020      .475 
FCQ natural 
 
   .6462      .579 
 
 .5001      .344 
FCQ price 
 
   .0550      .390 
 
 .6386      .236  
FCQ  familiarity     -.4987      .345 
 
-.4468      .207 
trust in science 
 
   .0684      .444   ¤   .1231      .256 
FTNS unnecessary 
 
 -.1572       .350 
 
 .1125      .196  
FTNS risks 
 
 1.0448      .372 
 
 .7767      .19 8 
FTNS benefits 
 
-.7851        .272 
 
-.3075      .156 
social desirability 
 
-.3657        .567  
 
-.2726      .372 
SC_IAT  
 
¤    .0435       .017 
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The previous analysis has explained the hypothetical bias, and socio-demographic and 
attitudinal variables turn out to be the main triggering factors. The results highlight the 
crucial role of technophobic traits for functional food. The quantile regression and quantile 
decomposition have been crucial to attain these results.  
In the regression model the differences between hypothetical and real auctions of Table 3 
are particularly important in the case of implicit associations (SC_IAT): in line with what was 
expected, these variables are not significant at all quantiles in the hypothetical auction while 
they are highly significant in the real auction. It has been observed that implicit association 
affects impulsive rather than reflexive systems (Strack and Deutsch, 2004). Therefore a non-
significant effect of implicit associations can be expected in hypothetical scenarios while a 
significant effect can be anticipated in real auctions. Our results confirm this hypothesis. 
Result suggests the importance of the implicit measures of attitudes in the interpretation of 
hypothetical bias. Also other variables linked to technophobia show different effects in non-
hypothetical and hypothetical auctions and different impacts at different quantiles. All the 
three variables used to capture the three dimensions of the FTNS are significant only in the 
real auction. In particular, the impact of the perception of risk linked to food technology 
(FTNS risk) increases along quantiles, highlighting the importance of risk perception in 
addressing both real WTP and hypothetical bias. 
Consistent with the literature (Frewer et al., 1996; Siegrist, 2000; Poortinga and Pidgeon, 
2005), our results confirm the importance of trust mainly in the real auction, with an 
increasing impact on WTP from the first to third quantile.  
Socio-demographic variables seem to have more effect in the hypothetical scenario. Gender 
and income are significant in the hypothetical auction and present an increasing impact on 
WTP. However, when actual payments are involved their impact is lower, as in the case of 
gender, or is no longer significant, as in the case of income. Table 4 confirms that these 
same general results hold also in the case of the implicit willingness to pay for the attribute, 
yet aspects related to health are significant in all three quantiles of the real auction. 
In the decomposition, gender, family income and frequency consumption affect hypothetical 
bias: women tend to bid higher in the hypothetical scenario; as income increases so does the 
discrepancy between hypothetical and real WTP; vice versa, higher consumption frequency 
tends to reduce the bias. In this case, more experienced consumers show a greater ability to 
keep hypothetical and actual bids aligned. 
The variables FTNS risks, FTNS benefits, SC_IAT, refer directly and indirectly to food 
technophobia. Risk perception and benefit perception toward food technology play an active 
role to determine the bias but with opposite effects: the higher the perception of risk, the 
higher the hypothetical bias. By contrast, perception of benefit stemming from food 
technologies contributes to mitigate the gap between bids declared in the different scenarios 
(hypothetical versus non-hypothetical). In addition to the self-report measures also the 
implicit measure shows, on average, a statistically relevant coefficient effect.  
Turning to the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition for the IMPL_WTP50 variable, on average the 
total effect is not significant. However, the decomposition highlights once again a significant 
effect both in covariates and coefficients, which are opposite in sign, such that the overall 
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effect is close to zero and not significant. The coefficient effect is significant for FCQ price, 
FCQ familiarity, FTNS risks, FTNS benefits and SC_IAT. In the case of implicit WTP the 
relevance of the variables linked to food technophobia is also confirmed. 
The results show that distributions of real and hypothetical bids differ and decomposition 
provides significant estimates. However, while the covariate/explained effect has a negative 
sign, the coefficient/unexplained effect is positive, therefore the total difference is not as 
wide as the actual bias. For the implicit WTP variable, the total difference is not statistically 
different from zero at and above the mean, but in the lower tail the difference is significant 
and of opposite signs. It thus confirms the Oaxaca-Blinder result that shows that the 
difference between the two distributions at the mean is not statistically different from zero. 
The difference in the lower tail could not be detected by the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition 





An experimental auction was implemented to analyze hypothetical bias and to assess WTP 
for canned crushed tomatoes enriched with lycopene. Hypothetical and non-hypothetical 
auctions on independent samples were used. The empirical analysis implements quantile 
regressions and quantile regression-based decomposition together with the standard 
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition based on average values. Quantile regression decomposition 
shows statistically significant bias between hypothetical and real bids at all quantiles. Implicit 
WTP shows a statistically significant total difference between real and hypothetical bids only 
at the lower quantiles of opposite signs. However, looking at the coefficient component of 
the decomposition, i.e. what we consider the actual bias, it can be seen that while 
hypothetical bias is lower than the real at the 10th decile, the opposite is true and the sign is 
reversed from the 40th to the 90th quantile. 
Comparing these results with the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition the total difference between 
hypothetical and real bids is positive and statistically relevant which is somewhat smaller 
than the coefficient component, i.e. the actual average bias, due to the partial compensation 
of the covariate effects. In implicit WTP, the total difference on average does not significantly 
differ from 0. While in Oaxaca-Blinder the actual bias on average is balanced by covariate 
effects, in the quantile regression decomposition the balancing occurs across quantiles. The 
somewhat coinciding results show the irrelevance of the bias in implicit WTP around the 
mean.  
Focusing on the factors driving the bias, Oaxaca-Blinder analysis points out two main groups 
of variables: socio-demographic and attitude toward food technology variables.  
Quantile regression and quantile decomposition has been fundamental to analyze 
hypothetical bias in the tails and could be further implemented to compare different 
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